Ukraine’s Incursion into Russian Territory: Rationale and Implications for the Direction of War

The ongoing operation has also surprised Ukrainians themselves, including military personnel, who were unaware of the leadership’s plans and now actively discuss its potential benefits and risks. Such careful planning and operational silence maintained by Ukraine’s military leadership marks the beginning of a new phase in the war and a shift in Ukraine’s war strategy, influenced by various factors and looming issues, particularly those related to sustaining necessary military aid and differing visions of how Russia can be defeated in Ukraine.

Given that Ukraine’s operation is still ongoing and accompanied by a significant lack of information, a comprehensive overview of its implications is not yet possible. Nevertheless, some preliminary lessons and observations can be identified that could help one understand Ukraine’s moves, their scale, and Russia’s vulnerabilities. To grasp the rationale behind Ukraine’s operation within Russia, one must consider the broader discourse on diplomacy surrounding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2024, the threats faced by Ukrainian regions as a result of Russia’s shelling, and other factors that may have contributed to the decision to conduct such a maneuver.

Ukraine’s Objectives and Rationale Behind the Kursk Region Invasion: A Change in Strategy and War Direction

The impetus for Ukraine to launch an offensive operation on Russian territory was the need to retake the operational-strategic initiative in the war, which had been on Russia’s side after Ukraine’s unproductive counter-offensive in the summer of 2023. Although Russia’s offensives did not result in significant land gains, it was still advancing slowly but steadily, paying a huge price and facing severe casualties. Besides direct fighting on the frontline, Russia’s forces also targeted Ukrainian civilians, critical infrastructure, and the energy grid. Specifically, the liberated by Ukraine regions of Sumy, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv have been subject to Russia’s attempts to penetrate the areas with subversion and reconnaissance groups and shelling by Russia’s artillery and aviation, which used powerful glide bombs on a daily basis, causing immense civilian suffering and infrastructure destruction.

Creating a ‘buffer zone’ in such a context appears to be a reasonable counter-measure. It is also vital given the restraints Ukraine faces in terms of using long-range Western weapons against targets on Russia’s grouping of troops. This restriction limits Ukraine’s opportunities to target them preemptively before they roll into Ukraine. Several accounts suggested that Russia was preparing to attack the Sumy region from the Kursk region in a manner similar to its attempted attack on the Kharkiv region in May 2024, which would again necessitate using more Ukrainian reserves, thereby weakening Ukrainian troops elsewhere, particularly in the Donetsk region, where Russia’s main offensive effort is concentrated.

To ease Russia’s pressure in Ukraine’s East and draw Russia’s reserves from there, the Kursk operation could prove helpful, though it might be risky. Ukraine deployed some of its most capable and elite brigades, equipped with advanced Western weaponry, to fight on Russia’s territory, which could involve significant casualties on Ukraine’s part and be troubling to ensure the protection of its defensive lines in the Donetsk region and elsewhere. However, this has not been the case so far. While Russia has indeed removed some of its troops from Ukraine and sent them to protect the Kursk region, this has not significantly helped Kyiv to pull the most capable Russian groupings from Ukraine, but it can change within time. Despite this, reports indicate that Russian shelling of regions bordering Ukraine’s North has decreased substantially, specifying certain provisional and positive results of the operation.

”There is a belief that Ukraine’s operation is inspired by the necessity to enhance its bargaining power, and grabbing Russia’s land could be helpful in this respect.”

Avoiding Forced Negotiations on Russia’s Terms and Strengthening Ukraine’s Diplomatic Position

The constant pressure exerted by Russia’s offensives, backed by considerable manpower, also created the impression that the war had either entered a stalemate phase or that Russia could not be defeated on the battlefield, especially in the West. These calls have been so persistent that they have driven more discussions and debates over the possibility of a diplomatic settlement to end the war, even if it meant Ukraine ceding more territory to Russia. The cracks in Western support for Ukraine, particularly the American part in the early 2024 and amid future presidential elections, have only amplified these calls while also encouraging the Kremlin and leading Putin and his entourage to believe that Ukraine will sooner or later fall and that Russia can outlast Western democracies by continuing to push forward and biding its time, either by eventually occupying more territories or at least preserving what it has already taken – with the possibility of rearming during a potential peace deal and then launching another wave of invasion.

There is a belief that Ukraine’s operation is inspired by the necessity to enhance its bargaining power, and grabbing Russia’s land could be helpful in this respect. Some observers even mention that Ukraine could seize control over the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant to exchange it for the Zaporizhzhia Power Plant currently occupied by Russia during such negotiations. However, such a move would be perilous and unnecessarily complicated for Ukraine, while it could also invoke criticism from its partners and the international community in general.

Lessons Learned From the Previous Counter-Offensive: The Element of Surprise Is Key

Certainly, the abovementioned developments impacted Ukraine’s military-diplomatic planning and could have pushed it to try and retake the initiative on the battlefield, even if it meant invading Russia.

This time, the Ukrainian leadership has learned from past mistakes and improved its strategic communication (Altman, 2024). The Ukrainian attack was not announced at all, contrary to the lead-up to last year’s counter-offensive. Instead, Ukrainian forces conducted the operation in a manner similar to the counter-offensive in the Kharkiv region in 2022. Operational silence, renewed intelligence gathering, electronic warfare, providing necessary air defense cover to advancing troops, and overall careful preparation for the operation by exploiting potential weak spots have all helped achieve the element of surprise and success.

Notably, achieving the element of surprise itself is difficult in modern warfare, given that the enemy extensively uses reconnaissance drones and satellites, enabling near-perfect transparency of the frontline (Bielieskov, 2024). The absence of extensive minefields, as was the case in the 2023 counter-offensive, has also contributed to Ukraine’s preliminary success. It seems that Kyiv’s maneuver was not expected by Moscow at all, or it was simply the result of Russia’s underestimation of Ukraine.

Demonstrating Russia’s Weaknesses, Attracting Additional Military Support, and Facilitating POW Exchanges

A couple of other factors are necessary to consider while examining the rationale for Ukraine’s offensive on Russian territory. One is the need to demonstrate Russia’s vulnerabilities and make the war more costly for the Kremlin (Gumenyuk, 2024). It is also another demonstration that Russia cannot attack Ukraine and ensure the complete safety of its own territory, which could create additional tension between Russia and its population. This aligns with the need to shatter the Kremlin’s ‘red lines’ myth and encourage Ukraine’s Western partners to provide more decisive support after seeing Russia’s weaknesses (Volker, 2024).

Another impetus for the cross-border operation could be sustaining consistent Western support by reshaping public opinion and impacting Western decision-making, specifically by demonstrating considerable results. In the case of the Kursk operation, this means not only seizing land that could eventually be used as leverage on Russia but also further degrading Russia’s army.

There are already several known cases where Russia sustained immense casualties when columns of its military vehicles, summoned for the defense of cities and villages in Kursk, were destroyed by Ukrainian strikes. Ukraine’s communication with the West regarding the provision of military aid appears to be more effective when the issue of military calculus and potential benefits is introduced, which can persuade even the most reserved and cautious supporters of Ukraine.

Finally, the need to take more prisoners of war (POWs) is another potential objective of this operation, and Ukraine’s leadership has acknowledged it. Hundreds of Russian soldiers have been captured thus far, enabling Ukraine to push for POW exchanges, bearing in mind that Russia not only holds captive Ukrainian soldiers but also civilians it captured during the initial months of the war.

The Way Forward

It is still too soon to judge whether Ukraine’s ongoing cross-border operation is successful since its objectives and scope have yet to be discovered. So far, it has yielded some noteworthy results, such as the destruction of Russia’s military equipment, gaining control over more than 70 villages and cities in the Kursk region, capturing POWs, and so on. It is also not yet known whether the Ukrainian army will be able to consolidate its gains and hold the territory. Apart from that, the Kursk region could be just a part of Ukraine’s leadership plans, and an incursion into other Russian regions like Belgorod or Bryansk could follow.

Nevertheless, what remains clear is that Ukraine does not intend to mirror Russia’s approach and annex the occupied territory. Ukraine acts in accordance with international humanitarian law and its right to self-defense as envisaged by the United Nations Charter. Despite Ukraine’s partners not being informed of Ukraine’s intentions, it appears that the United States, UK, Germany, and other major contributors to Ukraine’s security have supported Kyiv’s operation and are not against the use of Western-made equipment on Russian territory. However, the ban on long-range strikes by Western capabilities deep within Russia remains in force, preventing Ukraine’s more tremendous success, namely in targeting Russia’s airfield and aviation, which appears to be the biggest obstacle to Ukraine’s advances.

So far, Russia’s leadership has failed to halt Ukrainian advances. It refuses to send its most capable forces to the defense of Russia’s territory and instead deploys mostly poorly trained and not battle-proven conscripts. Panic within Russia’s ranks is traceable, and Ukraine has indeed managed to instill fear since its real and broader intentions, perhaps, are not yet known to Moscow. By bringing war to Russia’s territory, Ukraine might further impact Russia’s public opinion and demonstrate Putin’s weakness and inability to defend his own territory. Meanwhile, Putin himself refuses to acknowledge the scale of the threat posed by Ukraine and labels Ukraine’s action as a ‘large-scale provocation’ and Russia’s counter-measures as a ‘counter-terrorist operation’ (Besedina, 2024).

Indeed, recognizing that the war has come to Russia’s territory would mean a serious, though not definitive, blow to Putin’s regime. But given that Putin’s regime remains relatively strong and that Russia’s leadership does not care about human life, it can still use its considerable air force and glide bombs to repel Ukraine’s attacks, which will inevitably lead to the destruction of Russia’s cities and civilian casualties or redeploying troops from Ukraine and hence making Russia’s occupational forces much weaker and more exposed to Ukrainian attacks.

What exactly Putin’s choice will be is yet to be seen. Either way, the Kursk region operation has demonstrated a change in war dynamics and has already exposed Russia’s troubles to the international community, Russia’s population, and its military leadership. The Kursk operation, therefore, could become a turning point in this war and strengthen Ukraine’s position during a potential peace process, provided Ukraine will be able to hold the land. However, the West must continue supporting Ukraine sufficiently to ensure its negotiating power increases further. Achieving this will be difficult, but even the most robust authoritarian regime could experience significant setbacks in terms of societal dissatisfaction and be forced to reconsider its war plans. This could eventually happen in Russia, which has not faced an invasion by an external power in decades, but there is no guarantee for that, so neither Ukraine nor the West should count on it.

References

Altman, H. (2024, August 14). Kursk invasion plan developed by lessons learned from failed counteroffensive: Retired Ukrainian officer. The War Zone. https://www.twz.com/news-features/kursk-invasion-plan-developed-by-lessons-learned-from-failed-counteroffensive-retired-ukrainian-officer

Besedina, K. (2024, August 14). Intelligence, US-provided weapons seen as key to Ukraine’s Kursk offensive. Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/a/intelligence-us-provided-weapons-seen-as-key-to-ukraine-s-kursk-offensive/7743052.html

Bielieskov, M. (2024, August 13). Ukraine’s Kursk offensive proves surprise is still possible in modern war. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-kursk-offensive-proves-surprise-is-still-possible-in-modern-war/

Gumenyuk, N. (2024, August 16). Ukraine on the offensive: How Kyiv’s attack on Russia—and successful defense of its northern flank—has changed the war. Foreign Affairs.https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/ukraine-offensive

Volker, K. (2024, August 14). Ukraine advances: How the West can help. Center for European Policy Analysis. https://cepa.org/article/ukraine-advances-how-the-west-can-help/

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