Trump 2.0 and Central Asia: The Dilemmas of Deeper Engagement

Trump’s firm grip over the MAGA base and near-total control over the Republican Party will further reshape the American political landscape, making him an exceptional disruptor within the system of checks and balances. Adding to this, Trump’s rise to powers also represents a political project, promoted by certain actors in American politics—such as Steve Bannon and other ideological strategists—as a tool to accelerate the demise of the existing U.S. establishment and pave the way for a radical reinvention of the country. It is all about dismantling liberalism at home and abroad, from challenging what some call the “woke system” in domestic politics to undermining U.S.-led globalism and the liberal international order. This combination of Trump’s ambitions, personal authority, and his role as a project for systemic change creates a volatile mix, with significant implications both domestically and internationally. What will this entail for Central Asia?

As Trump’s second presidency – Trump 2.0 – begins, pundits and experts are debating how U.S. foreign policy toward Central Asia will evolve. Some argue that Trump should adopt a new approach to the region’s strategic framing, moving away from the long-standing policy of treating Central Asia as part of “South and Central Asia,” a classification implemented in 2006 when the State Department shifted the region from the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs to the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. Others, particularly experts from Central Asia, advocate for stronger U.S.-Central Asia cooperation on key issues such as connectivity, critical minerals, and the Middle Corridor. These discussions merge into well-established themes that have defined U.S. policy toward Central Asia for last three decades, a policy characterized more by continuity than by major shifts, regardless of whether the White House was occupied by Trump, Biden, or Obama.

Source: Vecteezy.com

At the same time, Central Asian governments expect their external partners, including the United States, to understand and respect their unique political and economic development paths, and growing regional significance. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has engaged with Central Asia as a major power rather than as a superpower, acknowledging the entrenched presence of Russia and China in the region. Across both Republican and Democratic administrations, U.S. interests in Central Asia have mainly revolved around three core objectives: economic engagement, political sovereignty, and security cooperation. American companies—particularly in the energy sector—have played a significant role, with total U.S.-led investments exceeding tens of billions of dollars.

Politically, Washington has sought to uphold Central Asian sovereignty, ensuring that the region does not fall under exclusive Russian or Chinese influence—a policy that aligns with the region’s own multi-vector foreign policy approach. Security concerns, particularly those related to terrorism, drug trafficking, and extremism, have also shaped U.S. engagement. However, Biden’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 marked a turning point, signaling a reduced focus on regional security concerns, a trend likely to continue under Trump 2.0.

Given this historical pattern of stable mutual political expectations, Trump 2.0’s impact on Central Asia will likely follow a similar trajectory. Unlike Russia, China, or Israel, whose strategic calculations shifted immediately upon Trump’s election, Central Asia has little reason for sudden shifts in mutual expectations regarding his presidency. U.S. policy toward the region—if we exclude Afghanistan and focus solely on the five post-Soviet Central Asian republics—has remained remarkably consistent across different administrations. Of course, Trump’s America First ideology—which frames China as the United States’ primary strategic rival—could alter this dynamic. If Trump escalates efforts to counter Beijing globally, Central Asia may emerge as a secondary theater of geopolitical competition. However, his administration is also likely to be preoccupied with domestic political struggles and more immediate international concerns, such as the Middle East, trade wars, and redefining global alliances. As a result, continuity in U.S. policy toward Central Asia is expected to prevail—at least in the early stages of Trump’s second term.

“Ultimately, Central Asia’s dilemma in managing its relationship with the U.S. under Trump 2.0 can be summarized as follows: Getting too close may burn you, but drifting too far could leave you in the cold.”

The fallout of Trump 2.0 policies for Central Asia

While keeping these broad considerations on US-Central Asia relations in mind, it is also important to examine the concrete consequences and implications of Trump’s second term for Central Asia. These will be analyzed through three key dimensions:
a. Trump 2.0 and Central Asia: Relative Irrelevance
If we take a broad, abstract approach and ask what Trump 2.0—both as an individual and as a collective political, business, and ideological phenomenon—immediately wants from Central Asia, the answer is quite simple: Not much.
Central Asia does not register significantly on Trump’s strategic radar, nor does it factor into the high-stakes competitions that drive his administration’s agenda. The region is largely absent from the key domains that define Trump’s interests, whether it be the race for AI and technological supremacy, billion-dollar mega deals, or grand ideological battles shaping U.S. domestic and foreign policy. Central Asia remains a geopolitical afterthought for the major factions shaping Trump’s administration—whether it’s Trump himself, corporate America, the tech-political nexus represented by Musk, or the MAGA movement.

This indifference is particularly evident when examining some of Trump’s major obsessions:

1. Money – Trump is fixated on securing massive investments from wealthy partners. In his first days back in office, when Saudi officials announced their plans for $600 billion investment in US economy, Trump immediately followed up by demanding they round it up to $1 trillion. This pattern is consistent with his pre-inauguration meetings, such as the moment when SoftBank’s CEO pledged to invest $100 billion in the U.S., and Trump instantly pressured him to double the amount. In comparison to these staggering figures, Central Asian governments and companies barely register as economic players.

2. Building His Heroic Image – Trump views himself as America’s savior, Israel’s protector, and a global peacemaker deserving of the Nobel Prize. He claimed credit for a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, which was actually brokered during Biden’s final days in office, and has since talked about expending the Abrahamic Accords. He has also consistently stated his intention to immediately end the Russia-Ukraine war, positioning himself as the only leader capable of resolving global conflicts. Given these ambitions, his foreign policy will remain focused on high-profile conflicts and negotiations, leaving little room for significant engagement with Central Asia.

3. Ideological Priorities – Trump’s political and ideological battles are deeply rooted in the domestic U.S. culture wars and global power struggles with China. In this grand ideological map, Central Asia remains largely invisible. The region does not represent a battleground for his war on “woke culture,” nor does it fit neatly into the geopolitical flashpoints that define his administration’s mission. We have to note that Central Asia holds some relevance in broader China-related geopolitical and geoeconomic considerations. As China’s economic presence in the region deepens, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and control over key infrastructure projects, some U.S. policymakers have sought to position Central Asia as a counterbalance to China’s expanding influence. The region’s large reserves of critical minerals, crucial for high-tech industries and energy security, have also drawn limited but growing attention in U.S. strategic circles. Still, when compared to Taiwan, the South China Sea, and U.S.-China trade and military tensions, Central Asia remains a secondary theater in Washington’s immediate China-focused policies.
b. Central Asia as a Collateral Victim of Trump’s Broader Foreign Policy Agenda
Rather than being a direct focus of Trump’s second-term foreign policy, Central Asia will primarily experience the side effects of his administration’s major geopolitical and ideological projects. These indirect consequences can be categorized into three key areas:

1. The Return of Great Power Politics

Trump’s transactional approach to diplomacy suggests that Central Asia risks being relegated to Russia or China’s sphere of influence as part of a broader geopolitical bargain. Trump’s foreign policy approach has been characterized as isolationist, unilateralist and realist. From this perspective, if Trump prioritizes negotiating major deals with Moscow or Beijing, he may be willing to “let go” of Central Asia, seeing it as a distant location and low-priority bargaining chip rather than a region worth direct U.S. investment or influence-building. In practical terms, this could mean less U.S. diplomatic engagement in Central Asia, a reduction in economic initiatives, and the tacit acceptance of Russian and/or Chinese dominance in the region.

2. “America First” and the Challenge to Central Asia’s Multi-Vector Diplomacy

Trump’s America First doctrine is centered on reasserting U.S. global dominance and breaking China’s ascent as a global superpower. If this ideological and economic power struggle extends into Central Asia, it could disrupt the region’s long-cherished tradition of multi-vector diplomacy. For decades, Central Asian states have tried to carefully balance their relationships with major global powers – Washington, Moscow, and Beijing – to maximize their strategic autonomy. However, if Trump escalates his global confrontation with China and pressures regional players to take sides, this could severely complicate Central Asia’s ability to remain neutral. In such a scenario, Central Asian states may be forced to make uncomfortable choices.

3. Dismantling of the Liberal International Order

Trump’s revisionist attitude toward international norms represents another potential risk for Central Asia. Trump has publicly floated radical proposals, including reclaiming Panama Canal, buying Greenland, or even absorbing Canada. While these statements may be dismissed as rhetorical provocations, they signal a broader disregard for the post-WWII international order based on sovereignty and non-interference. If Trump were to pursue any of these ambitions seriously, it would further erode the norms that protect weaker states from being absorbed or dominated by larger powers. More importantly for Central Asia, Trump’s reckless behavior will further embolden similar behavior from Russia and China, undermining the principles of territorial integrity and political independence that have historically protected smaller states like those in Central Asia. For Central Asia, which relies on international law and multilateral diplomacy to balance external pressures, this trend would be deeply unsettling.

Conclusions: Navigating Trump 2.0’s Potential Impact on Central Asia

While Trump’s direct engagement with Central Asia may remain limited in the early stages of his second presidency, the broader shifts in global power dynamics triggered by his policies could have profound consequences for the region, creating new vulnerabilities and pressures that challenge its long-standing diplomatic strategies. If Trump 2.0 significantly extends its reach into Central Asia, it has the potential to reshape the region’s traditional geopolitical balance. It could also test the region’s deeply ingrained domestic and foreign policy traditions, which have historically been defined by multi-vectorism, stability, caution, and resistance to abrupt change.

However, at least in the early stages of Trump’s second term, the administration will be preoccupied with domestic battles and high-priority foreign policy agendas—as outlined in previous sections. This means that continuity is likely to prevail in U.S. policy toward Central Asia, as the region remains a lower-tier concern in Trump’s global strategy. Despite public discussions on the Middle Corridor, critical minerals, and connectivity, Central Asia’s relative insignificance in Trump’s strategic outlook could actually work in its favor, allowing the region to maintain its established relations with the U.S. with some adjustments. In particular, Central Asian governments may adopt subtle strategies to align with Trump’s style of diplomacy. This means:
• Mastering the Game of Deference – Trump expects public displays of loyalty and recognition from allies and partners. Central Asian leaders, skilled in diplomatic protocol, can leverage this expectation without making substantial strategic concessions.
• Offering Targeted Quid-Pro-Quo Deals –Small but tangible transactions, such as deals in the field of critical minerals, could help sustain favorable ties without compromising the region’s strategic autonomy.

Ultimately, Central Asia’s dilemma in managing its relationship with the U.S. under Trump 2.0 can be summarized as follows: Getting too close may burn you, but drifting too far could leave you in the cold. The challenge for Central Asian leaders will thus be to find the right balance, maintaining engagement without becoming entangled in Washington’s shifting geopolitical calculations. Surprisingly, relations between Central Asia and the United States may receive an unexpected boost—not from high-level diplomacy under Trump 2.0, but from horizontal, lower-profile processes that go beyond specific administrations. These grassroots and commercial interactions, driven by societal and business linkages, have been steadily strengthening the foundation of U.S.-Central Asia relations, largely independent of shifts in Washington’s strategic focus.
One of the most promising aspects of this evolving relationship lies in people-to-people connections.

The U.S. has recently emerged as the third-largest source of remittances for Uzbekistan, with Uzbek entrepreneurs in the U.S. investing in logistics businesses back home, creating jobs and stimulating local economic growth. Similarly, many young Central Asians are chasing their dreams in the United States: pursuing higher education in the U.S., engaging in entrepreneurial ventures, and building bridges between the two economies. Higher education is also becoming a key area of collaboration. Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, major Central Asian countries, are actively reforming their higher education systems to compete globally, and English-language education is at the heart of this transformation. As English remains the dominant language in global science and research, deeper engagement with U.S. universities, research institutions, and technology hubs is a natural step forward.

Moreover, the growing presence of Central Asians in the U.S. presents a unique opportunity to strengthen bilateral ties through diaspora-driven engagement. These communities already contribute significantly to cultural and economic exchanges, and with the right political and administrative support, their role in shaping long-term U.S.–Central Asia cooperation could become even more substantial. While Trump 2.0 may not prioritize Central Asia as a high-stakes geopolitical arena, these horizontal, low-profile, but high-impact linkages could quietly deepen ties between the two regions, laying the groundwork for more resilient and multifaceted engagement in the future.

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