Cooperation and connectivity implications of the trilateral meeting in Ferghana Valley
February 2025
Fabio Indeo
Research fellow at the University of Siena and an analyst at the Observatory for Central Asia and the Caspian
The new year has began with a significant step in the process of regional cooperation in Central Asia: as a matter of fact, the Prime Minister of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were involved in trilateral meeting in the Ferghana Valley, paving the way for a potential definitive stabilisation of this sensitive area, key precondition to promote trade cooperation, connectivity corridors and renewable energy projects.
This trilateral meeting is the result of the improved atmosphere of cooperation in Central Asia, also based on the successful achievement of the border demarcation among these countries which has contributed to increase reciprocal reliability and political dialogue.
Since 1991, unmarked areas of the borders in the Ferghana Valley – a transnational area spanning Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – were often the scenes of conflicts between communities: the hard competition over scarce resources (water and land) in an overpopulated area has frequently triggered tensions and clashes among different ethnic groups. Furthermore Ferghana Valley has been the traditional hotbed of Islamic radicalism in Central Asia, where the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) – which was one of the most dangerous radical group in the region – moved its first steps, undertaking armed and destabilizing incursions in the neighbouring countries. Security concerns represented the main reasons which pushed authorities to frequently close the borders. In order to further complicate the scenario, the existence of eight enclaves represent another heritage of the Soviet times, which has imposed the need to define their legal status in these independent states: this appears particularly urgent for Sokh (Uzbekistan within Kyrgyzstan), Vorukh (Tajikistan within Kyrgyzstan), and Shakhimardan (Uzbekistan within Kyrgyzstan)
The Soviet-backed “social engineering” policy during the 1920’s has represented the main root of this problem: after extending control on these Central Asian territories, the Bolsheviks arbitrarily and artificially drew administrative borders – according to a Moscow-centered political and economic strategy linked to their interests – ignoring the balance between different ethnic groups in a territory until then called Turkestan, consisting of khanates or confederations of kingdoms but not of territorially defined states (with the exception of Kazakhstan).[1]
However since 2017 Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan started a bilateral dialogue to reach an agreement on the definitive demarcation of the bilateral border which was signed in January 2024, while in December 2024 also Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan agreed on the border demarcation, downgrading a dangerous source of regional conflict because these countries have been engaged in armed clashes over the disputed borders until 2023. It is highly symbolic that the three countries’ prime ministers met at the junction where Kyrgyzstan’s Batken Region, Tajikistan’s Sughd Region, and Uzbekistan’s Fergana Region come together.[1]
According to the Kyrgyz government’s statement, this renewed dialogue will allow to strengthen cooperation in key areas as trade, logistic, water energy and cultural-humanitarian ties. (Central Asian leaders look to expand mutual trade, Eurasianet, January 10, 2025). Kyrgyz official position is strongly linked to the recent development about a regional strategic milestone, namely the official launch of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway corridor on January 4, after the achievement of the investment agreement to finance its realisation, mainly regarding the Kyrgyz railway segment. According to the project, the 486 km long railway link should connect the Chinese city of Kashagar (in the Xinjiang autonomous province) with the Uzbek city of Andijan (in the Ferghana Valley) crossing Kyrgyz territory from east to west in the cities of Torugart-Makmal-Jalal-Abad. The CKU railway line is designed to transport 10-12 million tons of goods per year, strengthening regional connectivity between east and west as well as significantly reducing the costs and times of freight transport.[2]
“The Ferghana Valley meeting has confirmed the concrete engagement of Central Asian states to improve dialogue in order to deal with the existing challenges and to identify common approaches and solutions”
In terms of connectivity, the CKU’s implementation will be a strategic cornerstone of the regional railway architecture, as an infrastructural section of a wider east-west connectivity project which includes and combines both the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – promoted by China – and the Middle Corridor. CKU will enable to realize a diversification within the BRI, as an alternative and shorter route compared to the existent Khorgos-Aktau railway corridor (an east-west corridor that entirely crosses Kazakhstan, from the Sino-Kazakh border to the Caspian Sea), so becoming the first railway route avoiding the transit in Kazakhstan and Russia to deliver goods through a westward route. Uzbekistan will play the role of key geographic hub for the regional interconnectivity projects: after linking the future Kyrgyz railway section with the existent Pap-Angren railway corridor (a domestic link from the Ferghana Valley to Tashkent region financed and realized by Beijing 8 years ago), CKU would be connected to the Trans-Afghan corridor (Termez-Mazar I Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar) reaching the Pakistani ports of Karachi and Gwadar granting the access to the Arabian Sea, or it could cross Turkmenistan until to the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Turkey, opening a parallel and additional route compared to the existent Sino-Kazakh railway.
In terms of energy cooperation, the three prime ministers discussed about hydropower plants, which could help these countries to face frequent electricity shortages as well as developing an endogenous-renewable energy source to meet growing domestic consumption. Moreover, a renewed dialogue on the water management will provide security supply for a regional economy mainly based on agriculture. The Ferghana Valley meeting has confirmed the concrete engagement of Central Asian states to improve dialogue in order to deal with the existing challenges and to identify common approaches and solutions. This positive spirit of cooperation and trust will lead to the implementation of strategic trade corridors crossing the region within a scenario of political stability which will also attract investments and interests of the external actors in a win-to-win profitable involvement.
Note: The article is a revised version of an article published in https://www.natofoundation.
References
- A. Farrant, Mission impossible: the politico-geographical engineering of Soviet Central Asia’s republican boundaries, in “Central Asian Survey”, vol. 25, No 1-2, March-June 2006
- C.Putz, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Uzbek Prime Ministers Meet at Trilateral Junction, The Diplomat, January 9, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/01/kyrgyz-tajik-uzbek-prime-ministers-meet-at-trilateral-junction/
- AKIpress, Investment agreement signed for China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway project, December 21, 2024, https://m.akipress.com/news:811014:Investment_agreement_on_China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan_railway_signed,_construction_to_start_on_Dec__27/
- F. Indeo, The CKU railway corridor: the time has come?, NDCF Strategic Trends, July 12, 2024, https://www.natofoundation.org/central-asia/the-cku-railway-corridor-the-time-has-come/
- B. Pannier, Heads of Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Uzbek Governments Meet… Finally, Times of Central Asia, January 2025, https://timesca.com/heads-of-kyrgyz-tajik-and-uzbek-governments-meet-finally/