Moldova’s European Future at a Crossroads: Presidential Elections and a Contentious Referendum
November 2024
Vita van Dreven
THRI Research Fellow
On October 20th, Moldovans went to the polls in a critical moment for the country’s future, casting their votes in both presidential elections and a constitutional referendum that would deeply influence Moldova’s path toward European Union membership. Yet, the democratic process was overshadowed by extensive Russian interference. The results reveal deep internal divisions, allegations of vote-buying, disinformation, and cyber-attacks, exposing the extent of external pressure from Russia. This article delves into the details of the election and referendum results, the strategies behind Russian interference, and what lies ahead for Moldova as it navigates its European aspirations amidst ongoing geopolitical tensions.
Picture Source: Vecteezy.com
Extensive Russian Interference in Moldova
In the presidential elections, incumbent President Maia Sandu received 41.91% of the votes in the presidential race, setting the stage for a November runoff against main opposition candidate and runner-up Alexandr Stoianoglo (AlJazeera, 2024). Yet, much of the nation’s and international community’s attention was focused on the referendum, which asked whether to amend the constitution to include EU membership, thereby preventing future governments from steering away from this path. The Central Electoral Commission (2024) finalized the votes on October 25th, stating that the “yes” vote narrowly secured 50.35%, compared to the 49.65% who opposed the constitutional change. For a long time, it seemed like the “no” camp would win with a narrow margin, but ultimately votes from abroad were counted last and tipped the delicate balance in favor of Moldova’s EU future (AlJazeera, 2024).
As the presidential race played out, the referendum in particular was clouded by a series of alleged Russian-backed schemes, involving figures like Ilan Shor, to sway the public away from the EU. These claims have naturally been denied by Russia, instead accusing Moldova of running an unfair election by restricting opposition campaigning and pointing to a suspicious rise in votes for the incumbent president (Reuters, 2024). In late September, Moldova’s national security adviser, Stanislav Secrieru, had already warned of large-scale interference, estimating Russia would spend around €100 million to influence the referendum’s outcome.
A few days later, Moldovan chief of Police, Viorel Cernăuțeanu, stated that a “mafia-style” network was active to bribe voters to vote no to Moldova’s EU accession (Gavin, 2024a). Cernăuțeanu estimated about $15 million Russian funds had been transferred to more than 130.000 Moldovans in September alone. A key figure in the scheme is Ilan Shor, a pro-Russian former politician wanted for the theft of around $1 billion in banking assets, who offered Russian money to Moldovans if they voted “no” (Tanas, 2024). His political party was banned in June 2023, after “unconstitutional activities,” including accusations of staging a coup (Gavin, 2023). Shor and other party members were also sanctioned by the EU “in view of actions destabilizing the Republic of Moldova (European Commission, 2024).”
More recently, Moldovan authorities also announced they had uncovered a network of people trained in Russia and the Balkans, with the aim of destabilizing the country after the elections. This network was again financed by Shor and in extension Russia. In addition to voter-bribery, Moldova was the target of extensive Russian disinformation and propaganda campaigns, through both traditional and social media – particularly TikTok and Telegram (Scott, 2024). Through, for example, the spread of deep fake videos or the repurposing of old footage, Russian disinformation portrays Sandu as a Western puppet, equating a choice for the EU with a choice for war. Additionally, the Moldovan government has been the target of increased cyber-attacks, likely from Russia, ranging from leaking classified documents to fake bomb threats at important government or state facilities. In April 2024, Russian-linked hackers, for instance, took down government websites for over day.
As Russian interference is not new, the Moldovan government under Sandu has initiated new legislation and the creation of new institutions throughout its time in office. In May 2023, President Sandu, for example, proposed the National Information Defence and Counter Propaganda Centre, which aims to play a key role in ensuring citizens receive truthful information and increase Moldova’s capacity to combat misinformation (Necsutu, 2023). Other examples include the ban of Russian TV News and political analysis under the “Information Security Law,” revoking the license of several broadcasting channels, and setting up a Telegram account to actively refute misinformation spread about the Moldovan government (Wesolowsky, 2023). These actions are undertaken with continued support from the EU. After the voter-bribery investigation became public, the European Parliament adopted a resolution strongly condemning Russia’s interference (European Parliament, 2024). Its support is not limited to rhetorical support, as multiple Support Packages have already been adopted throughout the years, worth several billion dollars. The last and largest Support Package yet was adopted by the European Commission in October 2024 in anticipation of the elections. One of the continued goals is to counter foreign disinformation and interference through technical support and capacity building (Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, 2024).
” If reelected, Sandu’s government must focus on delivering tangible economic improvements, countering public disillusionment, and fortifying institutions to withstand Russian interference – all of which will require substantial EU backing.”
What Lies Ahead
Although a loss for President Sandu would not have immediately halted the EU accession process, it would have significantly challenged her campaign and credibility. The narrow margin, however, underscores internal divisions and the potential for future political instability. Moldova’s government faces challenges that extend beyond EU membership aspirations, and the tight referendum result may reflect this broader reality. As Solovyov notes for the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center (2024), “why do tens of thousands of Moldovans accept 100 euros and cast their ballots as Shor tells them?” This susceptibility to vote-buying suggests disillusionment with the country’s economic stagnation rather than staunch opposition to a European future. For some, the vote may be less about EU alignment and more a call for meaningful economic reform, signaling dissatisfaction with Sandu’s policies.
The outcome raises critical questions about Moldova’s European trajectory, as well as the resilience of Sandu’s government ahead of the presidential runoff in November and the parliamentary elections in summer 2025. In both cases, a victory for President Sandu and her party “Party of Action and Solidarity” is not guaranteed. Simply viewing the referendum as a victory for Moldova’s pro-EU future and a setback to Russia’s interference (Gavin, 2024b), risks overlooking deeper social and economic grievances. The government’s success hinges on more than its EU progress alone. If reelected, Sandu’s government must focus on delivering tangible economic improvements, countering public disillusionment, and fortifying institutions to withstand Russian interference – all of which will require substantial EU backing.
Looking beyond Moldova, its experience serves as a cautionary example for the wider post-Soviet region. The elections in Georgia, Bulgaria, and Romania are likely to face similar attempts at Russian interference. The outcomes of these elections will not only shape the futures of the states in question but also reflect their resilience and ability to assert their own political destinies, as they navigate the broader power struggle between the West and Russia in the wider region. For the EU to effectively counter Russian influence, it will need to boost financial aid, support anti-corruption initiatives to reduce election fraud, and provide the tools to combat digital Russian interference. Ultimately, Moldova’s narrow victory in the referendum highlights that its future remains closely tied to its citizens’ aspirations for a secure and democratic future.
Bibliography
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