How Will Trump’s Second Administration Impact the International Criminal Court and Russia-Ukraine Trials?

In a move that has shocked the international legal community, President Donald Trump’s second administration has again imposed sanctions against the International Criminal Court (ICC) (The White House, 2025). By imposing sanctions on key ICC officials, including Prosecutor Karim Khan (The White House, 2025), Trump has not only challenged the Court’s authority but also possibly jeopardized ongoing investigations into grave international crimes, notably those arising from the Russia-Ukraine conflict (Edwards, 2025; Liboreiro, 2025; The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR], 2025).

Amid the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, the The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been pivotal in addressing alleged international crimes by Russian officials by issuing arrest warrants (International Criminal Court [ICC], 2002). However, now that President Donald Trump’s second administration has taken a stark stance against the ICC, how will this affect Russia-Ukraine trials?

This article aims to assess the consequences of Trump’s renewed sanctions against the ICC, particularly regarding its ability to prosecute Russian officials for alleged international crimes in Ukraine. By examining the historical tensions between the U.S. and the ICC, the broader international reactions, and the legal and political challenges these sanctions bring about, this article will explore whether the Court can maintain its authority or face a significant loss of influence.

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The ICC’s Role in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

To understand the ICC’s role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, it is important to first outline its mandate. The International Criminal Court was established in 2002 under the Rome Statute, an international treaty designed to create a permanent institution for prosecuting individuals responsible for the most serious crimes under international criminal law: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression (ICC, 2002). It operates based on the principle of complementarity, intervening only when national jurisdictions are genuinely unwilling or unable to carry out that investigation or prosecution. ICC’s legal reach extends to crimes committed on the territory of member states or by their nationals, as well as situations referred by the UN Security Council (Cryer et al., 2019; ICC, 2002).

The ICC relies on global cooperation with both state and non-state parties for support, including making arrests, transferring detainees to its detention centre in The Hague, freezing suspects’ assets, and enforcing sentences. The Court’s global reach and legitimacy rely heavily on this international network of cooperation, highlighting the crucial role of its 124-member foundation in pursuing accountability (Cryer et al., 2019; ICC, 2002).

The ICC’s involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict intensified after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. While neither Russia nor Ukraine is a member of the ICC, Ukraine has granted the Court special jurisdiction to investigate crimes committed on its territory. As a result, the ICC has launched multiple investigations into alleged grave international crimes (ICC, 2022; 2025).

In March 2023, the ICC issued arrest warrants for President Vladimir Putin and Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, charging them with the war crime of unlawfully deporting Ukrainian children to Russia (ICC, 2023). This marked the first time the Court had targeted a sitting head of state from a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Investigations were expanded, subsequently issuing arrest warrants for high-ranking Russian military officials. In March 2024, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Admiral Viktor Sokolov and General Sergey Kobylash, charging them with the war crime of directing missile strikes on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and the crime against humanity of intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to physical or mental health. (ICC, 2024a). In June 2024, the ICC issued arrest warrants for former Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov under the same charges as Sokolov and Kobylash (ICC, 2024b).

These arrest warrants demonstrate ICC’s commitment to holding high-ranking officials accountable for crimes committed during the conflict. However, the ICC faces increasing political challenges—particularly from the United States under President Donald Trump’s second administration, which has sought to undermine the Court’s authority through renewed sanctions (Edwards, 2025; Liboreiro, 2025; OHCHR, 2025).

“By targeting ICC officials and restricting its resources, the U.S. risks delaying investigations and proceedings, undermining state cooperation, and ultimately weakening efforts to hold Russian officials accountable”

The ICC and the United States: A History of Opposition

The relationship between the United States and the ICC has never been without tension. Under Clinton’s presidency, the government cited concerns about the Court’s jurisdiction, particularly its ability to prosecute individuals from non-member states without their consent. The U.S. feared that this could expose American military personnel and officials to politically motivated prosecutions (Clinton, 2000). While signing the treaty allowed the U.S. to participate in early negotiations of the Rome Statute—such as refining crime definitions and limiting politicized cases—it remained unwilling to accept the Court’s authority over its territory and citizens. As a result, the U.S. refused to ratify the treaty and distanced itself from the Court, maintaining that ICC jurisdiction over its nationals should only be possible through voluntary ratification (Clinton, 2000; The International Criminal Court Project, 2024; Wind, 2009).

During his first term, President Trump expressed strong opposition against the ICC, particularly regarding its investigations into U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and alleged Israeli war crimes in Palestinian territories (Human Rights Watch, 2020; The International Criminal Court Project, 2024). The government threatened action against ICC staff and their families in response to the Court’s investigation into crimes in and around Afghanistan. This is because the investigation could expose serious violations by U.S. military and CIA personnel on Afghan soil or in other ICC member states—allegations left unaddressed in U.S. courts (Human Rights Watch, 2020).
Another key U.S. concern was that allowing an ICC investigation into Israel could set a precedent for future probes into American military actions. If the ICC asserts jurisdiction over Israel due to Palestine’s treaty ratification, it could similarly justify investigating U.S. actions in other contexts, particularly in places like Afghanistan, where the Court was already examining alleged U.S. war crimes. Viewing this as a threat to national sovereignty, the Trump administration took drastic measures (Human Rights Watch, 2020). In 2020, his administration imposed sanctions on ICC officials, including then-Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, marking an unprecedented move against an international judicial body (The White House, 2020).

The subsequent Biden government in 2021 adopted a more conciliatory approach, lifting the sanctions imposed by Trump in 2020. While Biden’s administration did not fully support the ICC, it acknowledged its role in promoting accountability (U.S. Secretary of State, 2021), particularly regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (Keith, 2023; The International Criminal Court Project, 2024). The U.S. strengthened its collaboration with the ICC on Russia-related war crimes investigations by providing funding and sharing evidence. (Senate of the United States, 2023). Although the U.S. remained outside the Rome Statute, the administration’s willingness to engage with the Court reflected a small strategic shift—one that recognized the ICC’s authority and capability in countering Russian aggression (Keith, 2023; The International Criminal Court Project, 2024).

Recent Developments: Trump’s Sanctions and Global Reactions

However, this engagement was temporary. With President Donald Trump returning to office in 2025, the United States has once again taken a confrontational stance against the ICC. This opposition is triggered by the ICC’s actions targeting the United States and its close ally Israel. Specifically, the ICC opened preliminary investigations into U.S. personnel and key Israeli officials, including issuing arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Former Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant, based on allegations of war crimes in Gaza. Trump argues that the ICC has no jurisdiction over the United States or Israel, as neither country is a member state to the Rome Statute. Again, Trump sees this as a threat to its national sovereignty and, moreover, a risk to the foreign policy efforts of the United States and its allies (The White House, 2025).

Building on the hostility of his first administration, Trump’s government reintroduced and expanded sanctions against ICC officials (The White House, 2025). The sanctions involve freezing the assets of ICC personnel, including Prosecutor Kharim Khan, imposing travel bans, and threatening legal action against those cooperating with the Court. These measures are not only aimed at discrediting the ICC but also at intimidating allies and institutions that support the Court’s work (The White House, 2025). Such measures directly impact the ICC’s efforts to investigate and prosecute alleged war crimes committed by Russian forces in Ukraine, as it undermines the Court’s legitimacy and may discourage crucial cooperation from other countries. 

This is exemplified by the mixed reactions across Europe following Trump’s decision to sanction the ICC (Debusmann & Walker, 2025), exposing deep divisions within the international judicial community (Edwards, 2025; Liboreiro, 2025).
The European Union (EU), traditionally a strong supporter of the ICC, has seen varied responses from its member states, ranging from criticism to cautious diplomacy. While 79 signatories of the ICC, including France and Germany, have issued a joint statement condemning Trump’s executive order (Multiple ICC signatories, 2025), Hungary and other states with close ties to Trump have remained silent—or even supportive—of his bold move (Debusmann & Walker, 2025). This division within the EU weakens the bloc’s collective stance, complicating efforts to counter Trump’s actions with a unified response (Edwards, 2025; Liboreiro, 2025). Ukrainian officials expressed concern that U.S. sanctions could hinder the ICC’s efforts to hold Russian officials accountable. Nevertheless, Ukraine appears to remain confident in the ICC’s ability to uphold justice (Agence France Presse, 2025).

Challenges to ICC legitimacy end enforcement

However, as discussed earlier, these recent developments could actually have important implications for ICC trials related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The Court, which has issued arrest warrants for high-ranking Russian officials—including Putin—relies on international cooperation to function. By targeting ICC officials and restricting its resources, the U.S. risks delaying investigations and proceedings, undermining state cooperation, and ultimately weakening efforts to hold Russian officials accountable for alleged international crimes (Edwards, 2025; Liboreiro, 2025; OHCHR, 2025).

In a broader perspective, the sanctions may erode the ICC’s legitimacy and authority, allowing individuals accused of international crimes to defy the Court’s mandates. With reduced support from member states and allies, the Court risks becoming less effective, as countries may refrain from cooperating in investigations to avoid diplomatic tensions with the United States (OHCHR, 2025).

Hungary’s stance exemplifies this growing reluctance. Its refusal to enforce the ICC’s arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin, along with its declaration that he would not be arrested if he entered the country, makes it a potential safe haven for Russian officials facing prosecution. On top of that, after the ICC issued a warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, President Viktor Orbán invited him to Hungary, assuring that the warrant would not be enforced. Media reports even claim that Orbán is exploring the possibility of Hungary leaving the ICC (Scheffer, 2025). Hungary’s noncompliance weakens international cooperation and undermines the ICC’s ability to hold Russian war criminals accountable. 

Conclusion

The implications extend beyond the weakened ability to investigate and prosecute cases related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Reduced cooperation from member states, diplomatic pressure, and the risk of further withdrawals—exemplified by Hungary’s defiance—threaten to weaken the ICC’s legitimacy and authority. Without international cooperation, the Court may struggle to enforce its mandates, allowing individuals accused of grave crimes to evade accountability.

In line with the aim of this article, these developments raise pressing questions about the ICC’s future in global justice. Will the Court withstand political pressure, or will growing opposition from major powers like the U.S. undermine its authority? With no expectation of sanctions withdrawal under another U.S. president and Hungary’s defiance setting an early precedent, the ICC is on track to face a significant loss of influence. Trump’s sanctions against the ICC marks a broader shift in international power dynamics, where populist leaders and nationalist policies increasingly challenge global institutions. If one of the world’s leading democracies actively undermines the ICC, it sets a dangerous precedent that could weaken international accountability mechanisms for years to come.

References:

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