From Allies to Adversaries: The Shifting Dynamics of Armenian Church-State Relations

Ever since the Velvet Revolution of 2018, in which Armenia shifted peacefully from an autocratic system to a democracy with free elections, the relationship between the Armenian government and the Armenian Apostolic Church has been under pressure. The same can be said for Armenia’s relations with Russia. It was President Putin who awarded Armenian Catholicos Karekin II the “Order of Honor” only last year for his “great contribution to the development of cultural-humanitarian links between Russia and Armenia” (Azatutyun, 2023). The recent rise of Bagrat Galstanyan, from Primate of the Diocese of Tavush to the leading figure of an opposition movement named Tavush for the Homeland is only the latest chapter in this developing saga of church-state competition. To understand this friction, and how the relationship might develop in years to come, it is important to look at the role of the church in Armenia’s history.

For most of Armenia’s modern history, the country has been under occupation, first by the Russian Empire, later the Soviet Union. During these challenging times for the Armenian nation, the church was a symbol and custodian of Armenian statehood. However, the persecution of the clergy and the confiscation of its property during Soviet times, all to serve the purpose of moulding the “Soviet individual”, meaning that when the Soviet Union eventually fell, many Armenians had a Church leaders were accused of money laundering, corruption and driving exorbitant luxurious cars, with some Armenian commentators calling it “nothing but a blasphemy” (Khachatourian, 2011). Somewhat peculiar relationship with the church. Rather than feeling profoundly religious or engaging in deep forms of piety, many Armenians view the church as a national institution that provides a moral compass, including what it means to be an Armenian.

Upon gaining independence in the early 1990s, the church quickly gained a special status within the third Armenian Republic. Article 8 of the constitution states: “The Republic of Armenia recognizes the exclusive historical mission of the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church as a national church, in the spiritual life, development of the national culture and preservation of the national identity of the people of Armenia.” The custodial role of the church throughout much of the 20th century is reflected in this article, but it also raises questions, in particular on the point of “national church”, since it could put into question the separation of church and state that legally exists within Armenia.

Those questions are not new, in fact they have been raised throughout the successive presidencies of Ter-Petrosyan, Kocharyan and Sargsyan. These presidencies were marked by corruption and saw Armenia develop into an oligarchic state. The system was able to endure due to two main factors: political and military legitimization from Russia on the one hand, and spiritual and cultural legitimization from the Armenian Apostolic church on the other hand. Naturally, church-state relations were positive due to their undeniable synergy. Even before the Velvet Revolution of 2018, this symbiosis received avid criticism. Former Prime Minister Hrant Bagratyan questioned the church’ secretive attitude towards its income and expenditure, calling it untouchable (Espress.am, 2010).Church leaders were accused of money laundering, corruption and driving exorbitant luxurious cars, with some Armenian commentators calling it “nothing but a blasphemy” (Khachatourian, 2011).

The Church’s Resistance to Progressive Policies

The Velvet Revolution and the subsequent leadership of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has turned out to be a threat not only to Russia’s dominant position versus Armenia but also to the position of the Armenian Apostolic church due to the secular nature of the new government. This led to unprecedented action from the church, which openly called for Pashinyan to resign following the 44-day war in 2020 (Azatutyun, 2020). Karekin II insisted that the church is purely guided by “national and state interests” and its positions should not be interpreted as biassed to any political party because “the Church is above politics” (Armenpress, 2021). Nevertheless, church members were seen marching in protests against the new government together with former president Robert Kocharyan in 2022 (Mejlumyan, 2022). Only recently the Catholicos refused to broadcast his traditional New Year’s address after his request to be put on before the Prime Minister was denied (Shahverdyan, 2024).

Major rifts have also appeared between church and state on societal issues. The church claimed Pashinyan was pursuing a so-called “gay agenda” in response to the government’s intent to ratify the Istanbul Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence. Church claims that the Convention “legalises same-sex marriages” or “introduces a third-sex” are simply false; the document clearly states that “‘gender’ shall mean the socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for women and men” and does not define what a family is ought to be (Bellingcat, 2021).

Yet, the Church’s response highlights a bigger trend that is still visible within Armenia: one of neglect and refusing the LGBT community a respected place within society. When two young gay men jumped to their deaths in 2022, some emotional tributes appeared on social media, but the majority of responses were expressions of jubilation for their deaths and calls on other queer-minded people to kill themselves (Avetisyan, 2022).

The Church as Russia’s Final Weapon

The church arguing the Convention conflicts with Armenian “national-spiritual identity and security” again shows how the clergy struggles with its new position vis-a-vis the government. It feels forced to make public statements to address politicians, something unheard of during previous Armenian governments because of the church-state symbiose that existed. As of the writing date of this article, the Armenian government is yet to ratify the Convention.

The deteriorating relations between church and state in Armenia are also heavily interconnected with the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The Pashinyan government made a strategic, although in part forced, decision to separate the fate of Armenia with that of Nagorno-Karabakh. He understood that clinging on to the idea that Nagorno-Karabakh integrally belongs with Armenia could prove to be disastrous for the survival of the Armenian state as a whole. Pashinyan is willing to make concessions to achieve peace and security, for example by ceding occupied villages to Azerbaijan and changing Armenia’s constitution. This naturally proved to be unacceptable for the church’s nationalistic stance, which quickly refuted the government’s intent to amend the constitution, stating it was giving in to “Azerbaijan’s expansionist ambitions” (Zargarian, 2024).

When Bagrat Galstanyan recently marched on Yerevan and called on Nikol Pashinyan to resign, this was only the most recent outburst of tensions between church and state. The issue should be viewed in a broader light, one of a democratically elected government that proposes liberal reforms and rapprochement to the West, versus an opposition backed by a clergy that supports religious conservatism. This schism is not unique to Armenia, it can also be seen in neighbouring Georgia.

Many Western states are currently seeing surges in support for those that support “traditional family values” and in Russia, the church has been entirely politicised to serve the government. As Armenia looks westward, the Church doubles down on its pro-Russian stance, vilifying progressive reforms and waging a cultural war against marginalized communities.”

For the Kremlin, Galstanyan can almost be seen as Moscow’s last hope to keep a degree of control over Armenia. The Archbishop is in favour of close, security guarantor-level ties with Russia, something the Pashinyan government has gradually moved away from. Armenia’s opposition parties, whose leaders are mainly pro-Russian and from Karabakh, were quick to voice their support for Galstanyan. The Archbishop has since then voiced his intent to run for Prime Minister at the next elections scheduled to be held by 2026.

It is up to Prime Minister Pashinyan and his government to convince his voters as well as opponents that liberal policies and looking westwards do not imply a renunciation of the church. It should not, the Armenian Apostolic church has played a pivotal role in Armenian statehood for over 1700 years and deserves recognition. Real reform, however means real separation of church and state, independent coexistence.

Secularisation is fundamental to serious democratic reform. This task is not easy. Liberal, pro-Western policies are constantly being criticised for not corresponding with Armenian values through social media and church institutions such as cultural centres. Here lies a task to convince the Armenian population that there is more to “western values” than LGBT rights, still a sensitive topic in the entire Southern Caucasus region.

Rather, there should first be a focus on ideas such as freedom and democracy through cultural exchanges and relations with the west. Only by gaining knowledge one can gain understanding. Until then, conservatism remains a straightforward opt-out, to which many are susceptible.

References

ABC Media. (2023, December 26). Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan: Revenge is the way to get your home back. ABCMEDIA. https://abcmedia.am/en/news/24427/

Armenpress. (2021, January 28). Armenian Church insists on Pashinyan’s resignation . Armenpress.am. https://armenpress.am/en/article/1041674
Avetisyan, A. (2022, November 16). Armenia: A young gay couple’s tragic fate. Institute for War and Peace Reporting. https://iwpr.net/global-voices/armenia-young-gay-couples-tragic-fate

Azatutyun. (2020, December 8). Armenian church also urges Pashinian’s resignation. “Ազատ Եվրոպա/Ազատություն” ռադիոկայան. https://www.azatutyun.am/a/30990171.html

Azatutyun. (2023, January 11). Armenian church head receives Russian Medal. “Ազատ Եվրոպա/Ազատություն” ռադիոկայան. https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32219303.html

Bellingcat. (2021, October 14). Armenian far-right and church opposition to Anti-Female Violence Convention. bellingcat. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2019/09/03/armenian-far-right-and-church-opposition-to-anti-female-violence-convention/
Espress.am. (2010, December 23). No separation of Church and State in Armenia? opinion. Epress.am. https://epress.am/en/2010/12/23/no-separation-of-church-and-state-in-armenia-opinion.html

Filippov, A. (2024, May 29). Why protests erupted in Armenia and whether Moscow can preserve its influence over the country. European Pravda. https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2024/05/29/7186951/

Khachatourian, A. (2011, April 6). The Borgias of Etchmiadzin. Asbarez.com. https://asbarez.com/the-borgias-of-etchmiadzin/
Mejlumyan, A. (2022, November 10). In Armenia, rallies against Karabakh negotiations fail to gain traction. Eurasianet. https://eurasianet.org/in-armenia-rallies-against-karabakh-negotiations-fail-to-gain-traction

Shahverdyan, L. (2024, January 3). Armenian public TV snubs church leader’s New Year Address Amid Political Rift. Eurasianet. https://eurasianet.org/armenian-public-tv-snubs-church-leaders-new-year-address-amid-political-rift
Zargarian, R. (2024, February 26). Armenian Church also opposes new constitution. “Ազատ Եվրոպա/Ազատություն” ռադիոկայան. https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32835725.html

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