Cycling Through Crisis: Domestic Distraction Amid Political Uncertainty

September 2024

Onnik James Krikorian

Journalist and Consultant 

This month will mark the fourth anniversary of the start of the 44-day-war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the former Soviet-era Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO). Following Armenia’s defeat in the 2020 war, there had been hopes that an albeit flawed trilateral ceasefire statement could lead to a negotiated peace settlement. All that changed, however, with Moscow’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Geopolitical rivalry and confrontation emerged in ways that it hadn’t before and there was even talk of the West ousting Russia from the South Caucasus. Having already chosen Russia as a scapegoat for its own mistakes, that appeared to satisfy the Armenian government too as it sought to diversify away from Moscow given distraction in Ukraine. Previous Armenian governments had already willingly handed over key strategic interests to what had once been its only guarantor and protector.

In terms of security, Yerevan has since inked new arms deals with countries such as France but particularly India. That was anyway natural given that Russia was already exhausting its own supplies in Ukraine and also out of necessity to rebuild its depleted military. Nonetheless, even though the Border Guard Service of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) left Yerevan’s Zvartnots airport last month, their presence had only been by verbal and informal agreement.

A much larger force on the Iranian and Turkish borders are there by a 1992 interstate agreement which might prove harder to negotiate out of. Membership of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) might be ‘frozen,’ but the country also benefits highly from the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Just a week ago, Parliamentary Speaker Alen Simonyan also acknowledged that Armenia could hardly leave the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) when the Almaty Declaration forms the basis for talks with Azerbaijan. This was crucial from a security standpoint, he said.

At any rate, energy and economic diversification, with Yerevan reliant on Russian gas and nuclear fuel as well as Moscow’s management of its railroad network by legally binding agreement, is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. Besides, the country is has been experiencing unprecedented economic growth thanks to the re-export of western goods to Russia since sanctions were introduced following its invasion of Ukraine. Closed borders with Azerbaijan and especially Turkiye particularly obstruct diversification in this area and the ability to find new markers.

Nonetheless, despite growing frustration with his rule, Pashinyan remains a democratically elected leader, retaining power even in post-war parliamentary elections held in 2021. If Pashinyan had promised voters a bright and prosperous future after coming to power following street protests in 2018, his rule has only resulted in massive political polarisation within the country, with a much larger segment of the population left apathetic and disillusioned in-between, and a disastrous war with Azerbaijan that many critics consider him partially responsible for. His ratings continue to drop and he is only fortunate that the opposition’s remains slightly lower.

But Pashinyan is a populist and just as he rose to power through that distinct skill in an otherwise moribund political environment, he is now again reverting back to those same tactics of old. Step in Facebook, Instagram and TikTok. In recent months, Pashinyan has publicly showcased an apparent passion for cycling, boasting of journeys of up to 70 kilometres, while wife Anna Hakobyan documents her own daily routine, visiting cafes, shops, cinemas and making dolma. He has also resumed writing poetry, something that he has done in the past. In 2009, for example, his poems were used as lyrics for songs performed at opposition protests. He had also used it during his ill-fated attempt at constitutional amendments in 2020, aborted by the pandemic, when he handed out information leaflets designed to resemble Armenian passports. On the cover, a map of Armenia united with the now defunct Karabakh and the then occupied seven surrounding regions of Azerbaijan.

If Pashinyan’s first term in office was defined by nationalist rhetoric and subsequent military defeat, his third could potentially usher in a long awaited era of peace

Even if the tactics remain the same, the situation today does not.

Just as some international observers believe that Armenia and Azerbaijan are close to signing some kind of agreement, interim or framework, domestic commentators have recently begun to assert that Pashinyan is now preparing for the next parliamentary elections in 2026. Some even believe he might call earlier elections in 2025, but Pashinyan will have to present to the electorate a reason why he should remain in power. In particular, having won the post-war 2021 snap elections with a manifesto in which a peace agenda was touted prominently, he will need a major breakthrough to demonstrate that it has been successful. Otherwise, like his predecessor Serzh Sargsyan, who staked his rule on the still elusive normalisation of relations between Armenia and Turkiye, his rule could otherwise be considered a failure.

Unless the opposition can unite or at least transform into a more credible political force, few believe that Pashinyan can actually lose power outright but it does look increasingly likely that he will no longer have a commanding majority in parliament. Already there are murmurs that the removal of the 2015 constitutional provision for stable majority rule could be on the cards pending a vote by parliament. In the meantime, Pashinyan at least has social media to convince the public otherwise, but that will still remain a gamble.

Some kind of peace agreement, perhaps backed by European Union and United States for his premiership, could help clinch victory. If Pashinyan’s first term in office was defined by nationalist rhetoric and subsequent military defeat, his third could potentially usher in a long awaited era of peace. But time is running out. Azerbaijan does not need an agreement as desperately as Armenia. There are already major bones of contention between the sides, not least on implied territorial claims on Azerbaijan through a controversial preamble to the Armenian constitution and the perpetual impasse on unblocking regional communications. Perhaps populism could be precisely what is necessary to slow or even reverse his declining ratings as an unofficial and provisional deadline of November to sign or at least initial points agreed to date approaches.

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