Critical Raw Materials as an Emerging Pillar of Central Asia’s Geoeconomic Centrality
October 2024
Ikboljon Qoraboyev
Professor of International Relations at Maqsut Narikbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan
With the waning of democratization expectations and the complete withdrawal of Western forces in 2021, along with the Western pivot to the Asia-Pacific—or more recently, the Indo-Pacific—the perceived centrality of the Central Asian region for the West seemed to weaken, leading to a rise in anxiety. For some observers, these developments suggested that Central Asia was neither central nor truly Asian but remained in a peripheral status.
However, Central Asia is once again becoming part of global discussions, specifically in geoeconomic and geopolitical discourse. The rise of China, global pandemics that highlighted the critical importance of supply chains, and the war in Ukraine are three factors crucially contributing to a reinvigorated interest in Central Asia on the global stage. As noted by Josep Borrell during the first EU-Central Asia Investors Forum in January 2024, “Previously, Central Asia was in the middle of nowhere, and now it is in the middle of everything.”
One of the emerging topics in this context is critical raw materials (CRMs), including rare earth elements. Central Asia’s potential in this sector presents an important advantage for geoeconomic alignments. According to the UNECE (2023), Central Asia has a rich and diverse mineral resource base, which includes mineable reserves of most CRMs, such as lithium, rare earth elements, and uranium. However, as Vakulchuk (2021) noted, until recently, surprisingly little attention was given to Central Asia in the global discourse on critical minerals. Things now seem to be taking off. A recent report by the U.S.-based International Tax and Investment Center (2023) highlighted the substantial potential of Central Asia in rare earth elements and its promise as a reliable supplier for the United States. While Central Asia has started to appear frequently in Western discourse, voices from the region are also joining and contributing to this narrative on the central importance of Central Asia in global supply chains of critical raw materials.
Notably, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the President of Kazakhstan, has described critical minerals as the “new oil” in an age of technological competition and urged the country to invest in developing this sector: “Developing deposits of rare and rare-earth metals, which have essentially become new oil, should be a priority task. Countries that succeed in this area will set the course for technological progress worldwide.” (Tokayev, State of the Nation Address, 2023)
He brought this discourse to the UN platform, arguing that CRMs are one of the region’s attractive points for global investors: “Kazakhstan will help mitigate the most immediate impacts of limited access to energy and critical raw materials caused by trade and supply chain disruptions.” (Tokayev, UNGA Speech, September 2023).
Similarly, during the Tashkent Investors Forum in May 2024, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called on international investors to explore opportunities in Uzbekistan’s critical raw materials sector: “Uzbekistan is rich in mineral resources and critical raw materials. (…) Last month, strategic cooperation in critical minerals was established with the European Union. We are also actively working with the United States and the United Kingdom to sign documents in this area.
A new Law on Subsoil will be adopted. It will be based on modern international practice. We express our gratitude to the EBRD for its assistance in this matter. We invite leading companies to Uzbekistan to implement projects on deep processing of strategic raw materials and creating high value-added chains.”(Mirziyoyev, Tashkent Investors Forum, May 2024)
In practical terms, when Central Asian leaders met with President Joseph Biden in New York in September 2023, their joint statement included plans to establish the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue, aiming to “further develop Central Asia’s vast mineral wealth and advance critical minerals security.” The European Union has also begun establishing CRM partnerships with Central Asian countries, notably with Kazakhstan in 2022 (Goethals, 2024) and with Uzbekistan in 2024 (European Commission, 2024). During German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, CRMs were part of the dialogue both on a bilateral basis and within the C5+Germany format (Ostermeier, 2024).
In this context, can we consider critical raw materials as a pillar of Central Asia’s “centrality” in the emerging geoeconomic landscape?
To answer this question, we need to explore several considerations and link critical raw materials to existing foundational concepts in the discourse on Central Asia.
Genealogy of the Emerging Discourse
When we examine the current enthusiasm for Central Asia as a new CRM powerhouse, it appears that this emerging discourse is closely linked to the global race for rare metals and, especially, the rivalry between the West and China. Advanced economies have entered a competition to secure access to CRMs to achieve their goals in decarbonization and technological advancement (Kalantzakos, 2020). China’s dominant position in global CRM supply chains is prompting Western economies to look for alternatives (Pitron, 2022).
If we look at the current discourse on Central Asia and CRMs, we see that it derives from this global narrative on the race for critical minerals and anxieties surrounding China. Much of the current policy and expert discourse in the West presents Central Asia primarily as an alternative to China and, more specifically, as a means for the West to reduce its dependence on China. For example, a Voice of America news piece suggests that Central Asia is seen as key to breaking China’s monopoly over rare earth elements (Imamova, 2024). Similarly, a CABAR.asia article refers to Central Asia’s critical raw materials as the next frontier of global power rivalry (Guseinov, 2024). While it is positive that Central Asia figures prominently in global discussions on CRMs, there is also a need for critical reflection on the direction this discourse is taking and the role of knowledge networks in shaping this narrative.
Challenging the Notion of Central Asia as an Alternative to China
Depicting Central Asia in Western media as an alternative to China and as part of Western economic strategies to counter China’s hegemony may lead to unrealistic expectations. As Vakulchuk (2021) already noted, China is already part of the emerging CRM ecosystem in Central Asia. China dominates the production of CRMs in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, is the main trade partner of Kazakhstan in CRMs, and is increasing its presence in Uzbekistan.
Central Asian countries’ engagement with China in CRMs isn’t limited to trade relationships. China has become a major actor both as a supplier of electric vehicles in Central Asia (Eurasianet, 2024) and as a key provider in developing EV infrastructure in the region (Eurasianet, 2023). Recently, Uzbekistan launched joint production of Chinese electric vehicles within the country (Gundal, 2024). This makes China an important player in developing the green economy in the region. Hence, it would be a misconception to view Central Asia as a willing partner ready to join the West in its economic rivalry with China.
Linking CRMs to Multivectorism in Central Asia
We should also link CRMs to existing approaches in Central Asian regional politics. For example, multivectorism is one of the important building blocks of Central Asian countries’ engagement with the outside world. Multivectorism isn’t just about foreign policy; it’s also crucial for economic development. Recently, Mirzokhid Rakhimov and his colleagues have referred to multivectorism as a development tool for Central Asian countries like Uzbekistan (Rakhimov et.al. 2020). They prefer not to put all their eggs in one basket. Foreign partners are also not ready or capable of satisfying all the developmental needs of Central Asian countries.
The increasing role of China in developing the EV industry and infrastructure in Central Asia highlights this reality. Central Asian countries are interested in strengthening their cooperation with different actors to achieve their development strategies, which must consider global necessities like the green economy, decarbonization, and high-technology sectors.
From this perspective, it would be naïve to push and perpetuate the image of Central Asia as merely an alternative to China. Central Asia will continue to engage with China in CRMs. We also have to note that the current Western enthusiasm in seeing Central Asia as a preferred partner in the CRM sector could be temporary. In fact, Afghanistan appeared even earlier than Central Asia in global imaginaries around rare earth elements. A decade ago, world media reported a $1 trillion worth of critical minerals in Afghanistan (NBC News, 2015). Yet today, such discussions have largely faded from the spotlight.
Long-Term Investment and Constraints
Developing CRM infrastructure and ecosystems need decades of investment and effort. Experts point to 30–40 years of efforts by China to arrive at its current position. In this context, developing CRM infrastructure in Central Asia requires colossal long-term efforts. For this, they need inputs from more than one global funding project.
As Vladimir Norov recently argued in an op-ed in China Daily, Central Asia needs both the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the European Union’s Global Gateway (Norov, 2024). We can add the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) to the same list. At the same time, they also need to address other constraints like global sanctions diplomacy, which can hinder efforts to develop the CRM ecosystem.
From this perspective, we need to extract CRMs from zero-sum logic narratives, which are mostly shaped with reference to U.S.-China global rivalry. Instead, an inclusive approach shaped by Central Asian countries themselves is essential.
Conclusion
In conclusion, CRMs are emerging as an important element in global narratives concerning Central Asia. This recent discourse, which often originates from Western perspectives (particularly in reference to China’s hegemony in CRMs), is welcomed by regional actors, especially given the need to maintain the relevance of Central Asia in global politics.
However, to genuinely consider CRMs as a pillar of Central Asia’s centrality in the new geoeconomic order, we must critically analyze the genealogy of this emerging discourse and understand the political rationalities behind it. We also need to delink CRMs and Central Asia from the narrow global rivalry between the West and China and the broader global race for critical minerals.
Moreover, we need to articulate Central Asia’s perspective not just as a supplier but also as a consumer. Central Asian leaders have been emphasizing the need to promote a knowledge economy model and to strengthen their position in higher levels of global supply chains. They are interested in building local capacity that will enable them to participate in higher-value segments of global supply chains. This perspective calls for an inclusive approach shaped by Central Asian countries, not by external political rationalities. By doing so, Central Asia can assert its agency and ensure that the development of its critical raw materials sector serves its own long-term interests and contributes to global technological progress.
Referencing
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