Swallowing Everything in Its Path: Can Russia Extend Its Influence Across the East?
March 2025
Tamta Pantsulaia
Master’s graduate from Vilnius University’s Institute of International Relations and Political Science, specializing in Eastern European and Russian affairs.
Nostalgia is one of the most common social phenomena that can evoke feelings of longing and melancholy for the past. Yet, at the state level, it takes on a broader significance. Today, the Russian worldview, particularly within higher domestic political circles, revolves around one formula that remains consistent regardless of changes in the political elite. This formula is predominantly represented by two key objectives: one is nostalgia for the Soviet empire and the desire for power beyond its borders, while the other focuses on total control domestically.
The total control and isolation policies enacted within Russia are proving to be rather effective. The country is faced with an authoritarian regime led by a single individual, characterized by a lack of competition in various sectors. This is exemplified in the monopolization of natural resources and energy, complete political authority over the media, the suppression of small businesses. Further, there is a significant centralization of power, along with intimidation and persecution of opposition figures.
Imperialist sentiments and nostalgia are expressed in various layers, with a desire to return to a past era appearing in several instances. These examples help President Vladimir Putin convince the majority of the Russian population that his propaganda-driven policies will restore the country to its former glory. If the control mechanism is lost, however, he risks losing significant support from both the political elite and the Russian population. This support reinforces the belief that the key to salvation lies solely in a powerful Russia.
Andrius Kubilius, a member of the European Parliament and former Prime Minister of Lithuania, interestingly remarks on Russian nostalgia by noting that “post-imperialist nostalgia acts as a form of dynamite for Russia”. He points out that Putin has been quite successful in instilling imperial dreams within the Russian population (Kubilius, 2022). It is intriguing how Russia’s authoritarian regime and Putin himself confront the notion that there is no place for Russia’s imperialist ambitions in the dynamics of contemporary political reality.
Photo Credit: Vecteezy.com
Unyielding Quest for Control over Ukraine
The global political destabilization following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the need to understand what we can expect from Russia. Putin serves as the central figure in a large pyramidal structure created by the patronal system in Russia. The system involves opportunistic businesspeople, oligarchs close to the government, and the political elite.
The war in Ukraine is, among other factors, a manifestation of a key message the Kremlin desperately wants to communicate: that Russia will not tolerate anyone – especially countries within its sphere of influence – pursuing policies it deems undesirable. Russia does not acknowledge Ukraine as a sovereign state (Sapuppo, 2023), viewing its national identity and pro-European orientation as threats to the Russian elite and their imperialist ambitions. Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council and a more vocal representative of Putin’s beliefs, has stated that Ukraine is a historical part of Russia (Osborn, 2024), implying that it should be integrated into the Russian political sphere.
Given the war in Ukraine, the unpreparedness for the swift expansion of Russian influence has become increasingly evident.
“The Kremlin’s aggressive ideological policy is driven by the belief that reclaiming its ‘historical space’ justifies expansionist actions, as seen in Ukraine and beyond”
Electoral Manipulations and Pro-European Protests in Moldova, Georgia, and Serbia
All three countries – Moldova, Georgia, and Serbia – encounter challenges on their paths to European integration, although the nature of these struggles varies. In Georgia and Moldova, electoral manipulations undermine democratic processes. In contrast, Serbia faces mass protests that have challenged the pro-Russian stance of its ruling government.
The persistent efforts of pro-Russian forces to disrupt pre-election stability in Moldova, along with tens of thousands of cases of vote-buying (Tanas, 2024), powerful propaganda, hybrid tactics, and energy manipulations in occupied Transnistria (Reuters, 2025) indicate that the Russian regime views Moldova as part of its sphere of influence.
The Moldovan example of the October referendum sends a direct message to the EU candidate country: The Russian stranglehold on Moldova remains strong, and it will go to great lengths to suppress the rise of pro-European sentiment in Eastern Europe. Russian sabotage is not a new tactic; the ongoing attempts to interfere in Moldovan politics highlight this issue further.
Russia will not hesitate to create political destabilization by any means, particularly with the upcoming parliamentary elections in Moldova.
The Moldovan example was also applied in Georgia during the October 2024 elections, where electoral manipulation proved to be relatively successful. A key difference is that the Georgian government has been pursuing an overwhelmingly pro-Russian stance, particularly in the last few years of its rule.
The Georgian Dream party’s pre-election slogan, “No to war, choose peace,” was accompanied by a substantial propaganda campaign that promoted the Russian narrative. They positioned Europe as a threat that would drag the country into war, claiming that maintaining a neutral position would help preserve both peace and dignity – a prerequisite, they suggested were essential for joining the European Union. However, this raises a number of questions about the commitment to a pro-European course, especially after the Georgian Dream-appointed Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze suspended the EU accession talks until 2028 (Davalou & Naughtie, 2024).
In this context, the continuation of pro-European protests is reasonable, although the widespread demand for new elections has not yet been addressed. Europe’s response has also been tepid, which further exacerbates concern that the Russian regime, aided by oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili and the opportunistic political elite, is attempting to fundamentally alter the pro-European direction outlined in Georgia’s National Security Concept (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia).
Serbia has also been added to the list of EU candidate countries, where ambiguous policies raise questions about the country’s direction. The political elite in Serbia openly portrays itself as an ally and strategic partner of the Kremlin (Stavljanin, 2024). The attempt by Aleksandar Vučić’s government to catch two birds with one stone and balance these conflicting relationships appears unlikely to succeed, especially in light of ongoing protests against his corrupt regime.
Vučić does not lag behind the Russian propaganda narrative in Moldovan and Georgian politics, claiming the protests in Serbia are a result of foreign interference. Geopolitical dynamics in the region are shifting as the ongoing protests in Serbia have introduced another significant detail to the agenda – whether the crisis could escalate into broader regional complications.
The resignation of Prime Minister Miloš Vučević amid the protests should once again alert the government. The ruling elite will need to clarify its stance on Serbia’s future: Will it pursue European integration, or maintain strong ties with its traditional ally, Russia?
Countering Russian Influence: Political Upheaval in Romania, Hungary and Slovakia
The emergence of pro-Russian political figures has become increasingly noticeable. In the context of these electoral manipulations, the unexpected victory of an ultranationalist and pro-Russian independent candidate Călin Georgescu in the Romanian presidential elections (The Soufan Center, 2024) is indicative of Russian-backed political influences. An investigation by Romanian intelligence services has revealed social media manipulations linked to Russian entities, as well as a widespread TikTok campaign supporting a pro-Russian candidate. Although the election results were ultimately annulled, the situation highlights how easily Russian interference can alter the narratives and influence public perception.
The sabotage of democratic processes in Romania, a member of the European Union, along with the precedent of direct intervention of the Russian regime, poses a rather dangerous reality for Europe. Imperialist nostalgia is a significant factor and a strong reason that should prompt Europe to assess the extent of Russia’s ambitions. Initially, this influence is notably visible across Eastern and Southeastern Europe, as well as in the South Caucasus. However, Russia’s geopolitical ambitions extend far beyond these regions. Hungarian politics and Viktor Orbán’s authoritarian tendencies present considerable challenges for the European Union, particularly in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The country’s strategic energy policy reflects a calculated double game, as it attempts to balance its relationship with both the EU and Moscow.
Hungary has opposed sanctions on Russian gas (Gavin, Jack, & Gijs, 2024) and has shown support for members of Russia’s puppet government in Georgia (Civil, 2024). A form of diplomatic manoeuvring with the EU to secure favourable outcomes for itself – this provides ample fuel for the Russian regime.
Slovakia is also revealing itself against the backdrop of the Hungarian trend. The Slovak Prime Minister, Robert Fico, has criticized Ukraine and promoted a well-thought-out pro-Russian narrative, which appears to be a continuation of his meeting with Putin. This has sparked large-scale demonstrations by the pro-European population of Slovakia (AP News, 2025). Fico has been known for his active pro-Russian propaganda even before he visited Moscow. His criticism of Western sanctions amid Russia’s war in Ukraine serves nothing else but Russian interests. Furthermore, using terms like “fascists” towards Ukrainians (TVP World, 2024) reflects a continuation of the Kremlin’s narrative, particularly Putin’s justification for the war, which claims that the denazification of Ukraine is the primary motive for the war.
Along with Romania and Hungary, Slovakia is another EU member state where the influence of the Putin regime is evident. Fico’s emphasis on Ukraine’s cessation of Russian gas supplies, coupled with his threats to stop humanitarian aid for Ukrainians amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, highlights one crucial aspect: the European Union urgently needs to address and counteract the Russian hybrid threat and initiate a counter-campaign.
The war in Ukraine has sort of stimulated the Russian narrative that the concept of the “former Soviet Union” does not exist, but rather it portrays its legal successor with a modified name – the Russian Federation – driven by imperialist ambitions inherited from the past. The Russian regime understands the essence of presenting itself as the world’s most powerful country, ready to eliminate any opposition.
If Russia faces no obstacles to its expansion, the agenda and power dynamics in Europe – and globally – will become increasingly unclear. To thwart Russia’s dreams of restoring its empire, it is crucial to first strengthen and invest in Ukraine’s political and economic success. The European Union must guard itself against becoming vulnerable to Russian influence. In an era marked by the active use of hybrid warfare techniques, it is essential to develop a robust strategy against populism and disinformation. Effective measures must be taken to combat the dissemination of pro-Russian narratives in both member and candidate countries, as well as to counter the negative portrayal of the European Union. If this is not addressed, Russia may continue to extend its influence in small, insidious ways, potentially leading to larger ambitions. A gradual shift in the global order makes coordinated action by the European Union and its institutions increasingly important. This cooperation is necessary not only to bolster the EU’s credibility but also to confront external threats and challenges effectively.
References
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Civil. (2024, December). Hungary Says to Veto Personal EU Sanctions as Georgian FM Visits Budapest. Retrieved from Civil: https://civil.ge/archives/643509
Davalou, L., & Naughtie, A. (2024, November). Georgian prime minister suspends EU membership talks until end of 2028. Retrieved from Euronews: https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/11/28/georgian-prime-minister-suspends-eu-membership-talks-until-end-of-2028
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