Aftertaste of Xi Jinping’s Visit to Europe: What Threats From the Chinese Charm Offensive for the EU:

However, it also felt that despite China’s willingness to strengthen cooperation with the EU, China had more to pursue in Europe. That is why it can be stated that besides relaunching relations with Europe, China strived to test its influence projection on the continent amid a volatile international environment with armed conflicts that caused problems for the EU, such as the war in Ukraine and the Middle East.

Additionally, the polarized domestic situation in the United States ahead of upcoming presidential elections and seeming fatigue in Washington over its commitment to European security and NATO, as well as the US involvement as a global policeman in various regions, also pushes China to seek potential geopolitical gains and fill the vacuum left by the United States.

First of all, Xi Jinping chose to visit France, which he perceived as a country that would permit him to sow discord both within the European Union and transatlantic relations more broadly (Larres et al, 2024). France, as a leading power in the EU, is the best choice for Xi Jinping because it is a leading EU power, an active security actor with its own nuclear deterrent, and one that advocates for greater strategic autonomy for the EU in numerous fields, such as foreign policy, defense and security, energy, etc. By engaging more closely with France bilaterally, China sidelines Germany as a critical state within the EU and often a rival or competitor to France, which frequently has divergent interests over leading the bloc’s international relations and engagement with third parties, including China. The fact that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz refused to participate in the meeting, and the EU was represented only by Ursula von der Leyen, is an evident sign of the lack of internal unity and cohesion vis-à-vis China.

China’s choice to engage EU member states bilaterally also remains a chief part of Chinese strategy, often quoted as “divide and conquer”, and it works perfectly with the EU (Li and Rahn, 2024). Not only is the EU grappling with achieving consensus over major foreign policy issues and security issues, such as the response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine or ensuring coherent policy regarding China (e.g., the EU struggled repeatedly to condemn human rights violations in China). It even finds it difficult to address critical issues in its neighborhood, as witnessed by the EU’s inability to stand against threats to democracy in Georgia posed by the so-called “foreign agents bill,” when instead of issuing a strong statement backed by all member states, the EU was able only to publish a statement of High Representative Josep Borrell, which is perceived precisely as a sign of the EU’s weakness.

”German Chancellor Olaf Scholz refused to participate in the meeting, and the EU was represented only by Ursula von der Leyen, is an evident sign of the lack of internal unity and cohesion vis-à-vis China”

Besides challenging the internal unity of the EU, China is also playing around uncertainty within transatlantic relations. France is a natural partner for China in this respect because it has always had a cautious approach to the US leadership in Europe, especially regarding making the continent more dependent in terms of security. French President Emmanuel Macron has often advocated for the EU’s more independent role in global affairs, reducing the influence of the United States. It appears that China is misreading the narrative of the French President. Considering the promotion of strategic autonomy, France is not seeking to completely sever ties with the United States because North America and Europe have converging interests that cannot be ignored.

The United States will continue playing a critical role on the European continent. Still, France is willing to minimize the EU’s dependency on Washington and enable its capacity to act independently when needed. While French rhetoric on the US can be at times too harsh or openly too critical, for instance, Macron calling NATO an organization with a “dead brain” or his statements that the EU should not be dragged into the competition between the United States and China and certainly not involved in the hypothetical war over Taiwan. However, it is imperative that when France advocates for the EU’s strategic autonomy, it does not mean only stopping being a “vassal” of the United States but also not switching from one hegemon to another – China.

The selection of Serbia (even though not an EU member) and Hungary as destinations for a visit was not just a coincidence. Both have had uneasy relations with the EU and close ties with China, and they could be considered strong promoters of China in Europe due to their economic dependency on Beijing. Against the backdrop of Russia concentrating on its war against Ukraine and the relatively weak influence of the EU on these states, who push to balance Western influence on them, be it historically (as in the case of Serbia) or politically (as in the case of Hungary with the hybrid authoritarian regime of Orban who is constantly undermining EU institutions and treaties), China can further undermine the EU influence on them and turn them into China advocates in Europe.

China’s primary goals in Europe now are to eliminate US influence and replace Russia’s influence, which has been quite strong for decades and has become more blurred as a result of its invasion of Ukraine. These efforts are supported by Beijing’s targeted state/media propaganda to undermine the United States and NATO. Xi criticized NATO on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of NATO’s bombing campaign during the war in Yugoslavia when the Chinese Embassy was hit. In Hungary, Xi said he supported Budapest’s more prominent role in EU affairs, which can eventually lead to greater progress in EU relations with China. In general, Beijing attains special status in its relations with Serbia and Hungary, as it, for example, calls its cooperation with Serbia an “ironclad partnership” (McCarthy, 2024). By granting these countries loans, actively participating in BRI projects, and helping to build economic infrastructure, Beijing invests heavily in these countries’ future political backing of Chinese initiatives in Europe and its potential support in international organizations and elsewhere.

In this light, the overview of Xi Jinping’s visit published by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a perfect example. For instance, as it stated, “President Xi stressed that China-EU relations enjoy strong endogenous driving force and bright prospects of development. This relationship does not target any third party, nor should it be dependent on or dictated by any third party. It is hoped that the EU institutions will develop the right perception of China and adopt a positive China policy”(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2024). The narrative here is easy to understand – China wants lesser engagement between the EU and the US and is anxious that Washington can influence the EU’s perception of China.

The summary of the visit by the Chinese MFA is especially interesting in the part of Ukraine. While the EU is pushing China to take a more proactive role regarding Russia’s war, Xi reinstated all the ambivalent phrases China has used for the third year in a row. The MFA states that “on the Ukraine crisis, President Xi pointed out that China, France, and the EU all wish to see an early ceasefire and return of peace in Europe, and support the political settlement of the crisis” (lbid). As it continued, “China’s objective and just position and its constructive role have been widely recognized by the international community. China is ready to stay in communication with relevant parties” (lbid). Both arguments can be heavily criticized, at least because there is no such common position of the EU that supports “an early ceasefire” or arguing that “China’s constructive role has been widely recognized” is also partially true for several reasons.

For instance, China has missed several meetings on Ukraine’s Peace Formula; China is continuing to be a critical lifeline for Russia’s war economy; Beijing is aligning with the Kremlin’s propaganda on the root causes of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, criticizing NATO and the US; China’s efforts to push Russia to stop its nuclear threats are considered to be successful, however, Putin continues to resort to saber-rattling no matter what. Indeed, the EU has not achieved any breakthrough in the context of Ukraine, and it will not reach it anytime soon as it seems more and more clearly that China’s position on Ukraine is more favorable to support Russia and prevent its failure in this war. Not to mention that there have been claims by Western intelligence that China started providing lethal equipment to Russia.

China is indeed an essential partner for the EU for so many reasons. As mentioned by Ursula von der Leyen during Xi Jinping’s visit, China is critical to addressing global issues, such as climate change, protection of biodiversity, and governance of oceans; the EU and China also have common interests in maintaining peace and security, and effective functioning of a rules-based international order despite numerous conflicts occurring in different parts of the world; China is a critical trade partner, as a daily trade volume equals 2.3 billion euros (European Commission, 2024). But while the EU is trying to reestablish its relations with China, where the EU would have a more profitable position and greater access to the Chinese market, the EU should not overlook China’s disruptive political influence and its use of dependencies to coerce other states to support its position on a multitude of international problems.

While the ongoing debate on the need to establish greater strategic autonomy for the EU is reaching new points, it is crucial that the EU communicates its efforts appropriately and does not send mixed signals to China concerning its stance on transatlantic relations. Engaging bilaterally with China also gives Beijing an advantage in negotiating from the position of power and presents the EU as a divided international actor. It will also continue to alienate member states from one another, which is why the EU should learn to handle China through the joint efforts of all the member states. While this can be problematic in practice, it is necessary if the EU wants to play a genuinely autonomous and leading role in global politics along with the United States, China and others, and be treated as their equal.

References

European Commission. (2024, May 6). Opening statement by President von der Leyen ahead of the trilateral meeting with French President Macron and President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping.
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_24_2462

Larres, K., et al. (2024, May 13). Divisions on display as President Xi Jinping visits Europe. Wilson Center.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/divisions-display-president-xi-jinping-visits-europe

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. (2024, May 6). President Xi Jinping holds China-France-EU trilateral leaders’ meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202405/t20240506_11293488.html

McCarthy, S. (2024, May 12). China’s Xi Jinping highlights Europe’s divisions ahead of expected Putin visit. CNN.
https://edition.cnn.com/2024/05/12/china/china-xi-jinping-europe-putin-intl-hnk/index.html

Yang, W. (2024, May 11). China tests European unity through Xi Jinping’s trip. Voice of America.
https://www.voanews.com/a/china-tests-european-unity-through-xi-jinping-s-trip/7607224.html

Li, Y., & Rahn, W. (2024, May 11). Did China’s Xi Jinping expose disunity in Europe? Deutsche Welle.
https://www.dw.com/en/did-chinas-xi-jinping-expose-disunity-in-europe/a-69047907

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